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Article 3

JUDGE IRVING A. LEVINE - A SEEKER OF JUSTICE
AND A DISCIPLE OF LEGAL REALISM
ALFRED

L. SCANLAN*

The unexpected and untimely death of Judge Irving A. Levine of
the Court of Appeals of Maryland on October 2, 1978 was a severe
loss to the bench and the bar and to the administration of justice.
This writing will not repeat the many deserved eulogies spoken and
written by others who knew Judge Levine well. Suffice to say that all
would have to agree with the words of Chief Judge Murphy that
Judge Levine "demonstrated qualities that earned for him the
universal admiration and respect of his colleagues and a very, very
special place in the hearts of lawyers and judges throughout
Maryland, and indeed well beyond our borders."'
Instead, the purpose of this article will be to examine some
representative opinions of Judge Levine in an effort to better
understand both the core and the contours of his judicial philosophy.
The article suffers from the limitations imposed by the few opinions
examined and the restricted areas of the law to which reference is
made. Specifically, the writer will discuss briefly some opinions of
Judge Levine in the fields of administrative law, first amendment
law, criminal law, consumer law and, if the reader will pardon the
expression, the law of the little man, and lawyers', or technical, law.
These selective categories, of course, are not all-inclusive, but I hope
they may assist in painting some picture of Judge Levine's
memorable work as an appellate judge.
His approach to administrative law was traditional and
straightforward. On one hand, he was willing to afford wide scope to
the expertise and the decisions of administrative agencies when they
were operating within their assigned zones of authority and
competence. As he said in Potomac Edison Co. v. Public Service
Commission in upholding an electric utility rate set by the
commission: "decisions of the Commission are prima facie correct,
and its judgment is accorded the respect due an informed body that
'2
is aided by a competent and experienced staff."
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On the other hand, Judge Levine was a stickler for fair
administrative procedure. Illustrative is his opinion in Bethesda
Management Services, Inc. v. Department of Licensing and
Regulation.3 In that case, the Commissioner of Labor and Industry
had revoked the license of employment agencies on the ground of
fraud after reading the record of the hearing conducted by a hearing
officer, but without serving proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and giving the employment agencies the opportunity to
file exceptions and to present argument. Judge Levine reversed the
commissioner's decision, holding that while the commissioner may
have been free to decide without attending the hearing, he was
required to serve a copy of the proposed decision, findings, and
conclusions of the hearing officer upon the appellants, and to permit
4
them to present argument to him before rendering his decision.
Although Judge Levine yielded second place to no one in his
devotion to the broad principles of the first amendment, he
recognized that these principles were not without limitation. One
such limitation was applied by Judge Levine, speaking for the court,
in International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 1805 v.
Mayo.5 In that case, he ruled against a defendant union newspaper
in a libel action in which the plaintiff had met the New York Times
test of knowing falsity or reckless disregard of truth, concluding as a
consequence that the first amendment offered no obstacle to the
recovery of presumed and punitive damages without proof of injury
to the plaintiffs reputation. Again, in Sigma Delta Chi v. Speaker,
Maryland House of Delegates,6 Judge Levine demonstrated that the
sweeping prohibitions of the first amendment, as made applicable to
the states through the fourteenth amendment, do not grant an
unrestrained right of the press to gather information. Thus, Judge
Levine upheld legislative rules of the Maryland Senate and House of
Delegates that barred recording instruments and electronic devices
in the Senate and House Chambers without the respective permission of the President and Speaker.
Turning to the criminal law, it is apparent that Judge Levine set
great store in preserving ancient constitutional principles established for the protection of all citizens, including criminal defendants, and, at the same time, relied on the blandishments of common
sense in interpreting those principles in a modern setting. For
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276 Md. 619, 350 A.2d 390 (1976).
Id. at 628-29, 350 A.2d at 395.
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example, in State v. Wilson 7 he wrote the opinion for the court,
which held that the taking down of serial numbers on various
articles, such as television sets, stereo equipment, speakers, radios,
and cameras, during execution of a search warrant that was limited
to narcotics and narcotic paraphernalia in order to determine
whether those items were stolen goods, constituted an unreasonable
search and seizure. Judge Levine resisted extension of the "plain
view" doctrine to the situation before the court, as the circumstances
demonstrated that it was not immediately apparent to the police that
they had evidence before them. He interpreted this last-stated
element to constitute "a requirement that police have probable cause
''
to believe the evidence is incriminating before they seize it. 8
Similarly, in his dissent in Mobley v. State,9 Judge Levine
disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the "exigent circumstances" doctrine permitted the police to conduct a warrantless
search of an automobile in which the defendants had been riding
following the removal of the automobile to the police station. Judge
Levine acknowledged the basis for the "automobile exception" from
restrictions otherwise imposed by the fourth amendment as made
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, pointing
out that the exception "has been consistently 'justified on the basis
that an automobile is so readily movable as to make impracticable
the obtaining of a search warrant.'"10 Nevertheless, he observed,
once the occupants of the car were safely in custody and were
prevented from gaining access to it, any exigency had ceased and
the police should have obtained a warrant before searching the car.
In both Mobley and Wilson Judge Levine adhered to the
language and spirit of the fourth amendment and refused to expand
intrusions permitted under certain judicially enunciated exceptions
to the otherwise applicable prohibitions of the amendment. Nevertheless, in both instances his refusals to expand the exceptions
rested on a realistic understanding of the particular facts of the
cases before the court and were not born of a zealous desire to push
the commands of the fourth amendment to the nth power.
Another example of Judge Levine's reluctance to expand
constitutional doctrines to thresholds not supported by the facts may
be found in Bowers v. State," in which he upheld a statute that

7. 279 Md. 189, 367 A.2d 1223 (1977).
8. Id. at 195, 367 A.2d at 1227.
9. 270 Md. 76, 90, 310 A.2d 803, 811 (1973).

10. Id. (Levine, J., dissenting) (quoting majority, id. at 80, 310 A.2d at 806).
11. 283 Md. 115, 389 A.2d 341 (1978).
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defined the felony of child abuse as physical injury sustained as a
result of cruel or inhuman treatment. Over objections that the
statute was unconstitutionally vague, he concluded that a criminal
statute is not void merely because it permits the exercise of some
discretion on the part of law enforcement and judicial officers; only
when a statute is so broad as to be susceptible to irrational and
selective patterns of enforcement will it be held unconstitutional. 12
Conceding that the vagueness of the statute may have a "chilling
effect" on fundamental liberties, he found that the Maryland child
abuse law nevertheless survived constitutional scrutiny. In so doing,
he noted that the language of the statute appeared to be "nothing
but a codification of the common law principles concerning the
limits of permissible parental chastisement."' 1 3 Continuing, he
observed that "[slince the contours of the common law privilege [of
parental discipline] have been subject for centuries to definition and
refinement through careful and constant judicial decisionmaking,"' 14 the language of the statute had acquired a relatively
widely accepted connotation in the law and that use of such
language in the child abuse statute did not, therefore, render the law
constitutionally infirm.
It was perhaps in the new and still evolving area of the law loosely described as consumer law - that Judge Levine most clearly
exhibited, as Judge Davidson, then of the Court of Special Appeals,
put it in her eulogy, "his ability to understand the changing world
around him and the demands that an evolving complex society
places on the individual."' 5 Several examples illustrate this point.
In Maryland Board of Pharmacy v. Say-A-Lot, Inc.,16 Judge
Levine spoke for the court in declaring unconstitutional a state
statute that banned the advertising of prescription drug prices. In
his opinion, Judge Levine referred to testimony concerning the
impact of the law on senior citizens, many of whom were on
maintenance drugs, but were prevented from shopping for the lowest
available drug prices by the statutory proscription against advertising. He noted that this was "a matter of great concern for the
elderly, the sick, and the economically disadvantaged, for it is such
persons who are less mobile and, therefore less able to survey drug
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stores for comparative prices." 17 From these evidentiary premises he
proceeded to the conclusion that the statute bore no reasonable
relation to the wholly permissible regulation of professional services
affecting the public health and welfare. Rather, said Judge Levine,
the statute "prohibits advertising of consumer goods sold within the
scope of the pharmacist's retail activity." ' As such, it offended due
process because it bore no real and substantial relationship to the
objectives it sought to obtain.
Judge Levine also wrote for the court in Sard v. Hardy,19 which
adopted the law of "informed consent" in Maryland, holding that
unless a patient is adequately apprised by the physician of the
material risk and the therapeutic alternatives incident to the
proposed treatment, any consent that the patient gives to the
surgical procedure, whether it is oral or written, is necessarily
ineffective. Judge Levine stated that in order for the patient's
consent to be effective, it must have been an "informed consent,"
that is, "one that is given after the patient has received a fair and
reasonable explanation of the contemplated treatment or procedure." 20 However, Judge Levine did not fling the doors wide open
and expose physicians to vexacious and frivolous malpractice suits.
His opinion prescribed an objective test for applying the doctrine of
informed consent. That test is whether "a reasonable person in the
patient's position would have withheld consent to the surgery or
therapy had all material risks been disclosed."' 2 1 Thus, if disclosure
of all material risks would not have changed the decision of a
reasonable person in the position of the patient, there will be no
recovery because "there is no causal connection between nondisclo' 22
sure and his damage.
Another of Judge Levine's opinions that demonstrated his
concern for the average citizen involved in the toils of litigation is
Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hospital Association.23 In that
case, he rejected both the "strict locality" and the "similar locality"
tests in determining the standard of care that must be exercised by
physicians in the treatment of their patients. Carefully noting that
the circumstances of medical practice which may have justified the
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Id. at 105, 311 A.2d at 244.
Id. at 116, 311 A.2d at 249.
281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977).
Id. at 439, 379 A.2d at 1019.
Id. at 450, 379 A.2d at 1025.
Id.
276 Md. 187, 349 A.2d 245 (1975).
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locality rules fifty or one hundred years ago had changed, he
concluded that those older rules "cannot be reconciled with the
realities of medical practice today [where] '[n]ew techniques and
discoveries are available to all doctors within a short period of time
through the medical journals, closed circuit television programs,
special radio networks for doctors, tape recorded digests of medical
literature, and current correspondence courses.'"24
Finally, just as he had demonstrated his concern for the aged
and the sick, Judge Levine manifested an enlightened solicitude for
the average working person. In Wiley Manufacturing Co. v.
Wilson, 25 he held that when employees were injured while taking a
shortcut route along a railroad right-of-way to the company's
parking lot approximately 790 feet from the entrance to their place of
employment, and the employees had traveled that same route
regularly for several years with the implied consent of the employer,
the "proximity" rule operated as an exception to the general rule
that an injury sustained by employees while going to or returning
from their employment is not compensable under Maryland's
workmen's compensation statute. Accordingly, he concluded that the
employees' injuries arose out of and in the course of their
employment and were compensable under the statute. In reaching
his decision, Judge Levine pointed out that the Workmen's
Compensation Act "is to be so interpreted and construed as to
effectuate its general social purpose .... ,,26
In the general area which, for want of a better term I shall call
"lawyers' law," Judge Levine again demonstrated his preference for
present facts over past fictions. His decisions were influenced by his
conception of the common law which he refused to view as a static
body of absolute and unyielding principles. 27 Rather, he said, "the
genius of the common law lies in its capacity to respond to the everchanging needs and conditions of human society." 28 For example, in
Sherman v. Suburban Trust Co.,2 9 he dissented from the majority's

refusal to consider the question whether Maryland should abandon
the common law distinctions between invitees, licensees, and
trespassers for purposes of the law of premises liability. Pointedly,
Judge Levine observed:
24. Id. at 194, 349 A.2d at 249 (quoting Note, An Evaluation of Changes in the
Medical Standard of Care, 23 VAND. L. REV. 729, 732 (1970)).
25. 280 Md. 200, 373 A.2d 613 (1977).
26. Id. at 217, 373 A.2d at 622.
27. State v. Williamson, 282 Md. 100, 114, 382 A.2d 588, 596 (1978) (concurring
opinion).
28. Id. at 114-15, 382 A.2d at 596 (Levine, J., concurring).
29. 282 Md. 238, 384 A.2d 76 (1978).
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Retention of the archaic doctrine predicating the duty of a
landowner solely upon the status of the injured party as a
trespasser, licensee or invitee can be no longer justified in terms
of either logic or social policy. Although it was once thought that
the common law approach was necessary to protect a landowner's right to the free use and enjoyment of his property,...
the emerging and more enlightened view, in my opinion, is that
society's interest in the safety of its members outweighs30 its
interest in the occupier's unrestricted use of his premises.
In State v. Williamson,31 Judge Levine, in a concurring opinion,
called for the abolition of the distinction between principals and
accessories, arguing that the "common law principles of accomplicity and their procedural counterparts . . . have injected a most

undesirable hypertechnicality into the law of accomplice responsibility, which not infrequently operates to thwart justice and reduce
'

judicial efficiency. "32

On the other hand, Judge Levine's preference for substance over
form did not tempt him to tolerate sloppy lawyering. In Walko Corp.
v. Burger Chef Systems, Inc., 3 3 for example, Judge Levine, speaking

for the court in response to a question certified to it by the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, held
that the statute of limitations was not suspended during the
pendency of a defective motion for leave to intervene. The motion
was ultimately denied in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, and Judge Levine noted that a ruling that the
statute was suspended would permit a plaintiff to "toll the statute of
limitations by filing a suit which was later dismissed as being
procedurally defective, [and thus] ... effectively postpone the
34
running of the statute for an indefinite period of time."
CONCLUSION

This abbreviated survey of some representative opinions
authored by Judge Levine permits, the writer believes, several
conclusions. Unquestionably, he was a most careful student of the
law. He also paid attention to precedents, especially when they
corresponded with present reality and served the achievement of
justice. He also was willing to let government work - to allow "some

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 252, 384 A.2d at 84 (Levine, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
282 Md. 100, 382 A.2d 588 (1978).
Id. at 113, 282 A.2d at 595 (Levine, J., concurring).
281 Md. 207, 378 A.2d 1100 (1977).
Id.at 215, 378 A.2d at 1104.
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play at the joints" of the law, as Mr. Justice Holmes once observed.
On the other hand, Judge Levine was quick to intervene when the
government acted unfairly or departed from fundamental constitutional principles. He was also inclined to watch out for the average
citizen -

the little person -

when the latter was caught up in the

toils of the law, especially in litigation against more powerful
adversaries such as government, business interests, or doctors.
I think, then, that it is fair to classify Judge Levine as a judicial
activist. By that I mean a judge often willing to prefer justice over
legal forms and ancient but outmoded rules. On the other hand, his
judicial activism was strongly tempered by his respect for the body
of the common law and was guided by the pull of the facts of the
case before the court. It is certainly appropriate to classify Judge
Levine as a seeker of justice and a judicial activist when necessary
to achieve that objective. It is equally accurate, however, to regard
him as a disciple of legal realism unwilling to carry the quest for
perfect justice beyond the boundaries marked out by the facts of a
particular case. In equal combination, those two components, I feel,
made up the essence of his judicial philosophy. He applied that
philosophy well in the service of the people of Maryland during his
35
tenure on the Court of Appeals.
35. The author, because of the limitations of time and space, has not done justice
to Judge Levine's memorable career on the Court of Appeals. He hopes that in the
future someone will undertake a more comprehensive and more profound analysis of
Judge Levine's many opinions in an attempt to distill further his judicial philosophy
as it found its way into the reported cases during his service as an appellate judge.

